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Over the past 15 years, a revolution has occurred in U.S. merger
policy. ~ Antitrust attacks on non-horizontal mergers have all but disap-
peared. Regulation of horizontal mergers now starts from the presump-
tion that "the vast majority of horizontal mergers pose no market power
problems and should simply be approved rapidly" (Schmalensee 1987,
p. 44). In February 1986, the Reagan adminisration urged Congress to
codify the new interpretation of Section 7 and to mandate consideration
of a merger’s salutory effects on economic efficiency.2 If former Com-
merce Secretary Baldridge had had his way, the Administration would
have sought complete repeal of the antimerger law.
Reversal of the conventional wisdom on mergers can be traced to
acceptance of Robert Bork’s views on the subject. In large measure, the
case for the status quo rests on the soundness of his position. As a
result, I shall discuss that position in some detail. Finding it deeply
flawed, I then propose a research agenda for those who doubt the ade-
quacy of current enforcement. I begin, however, with a brief discussion
of the U.S. Supreme Court opinion that did so much to inspire retreat
from an activist policy stance.
The Status Quo Ante: Von’s
In 1960, Von’s Grocery Company acquired Shopping Bag Food
Stores. Both companies operated chains of retail grocery stores in the
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Los Angeles metropolitan area. In 1958, Von’s ranked third in area sales
with 4.7 percent of the market and Shopping Bag ranked sixth with 4.2
percent of the market.3 The largest seller in the area, Safeway, enjoyed a
market share of 8 percent. The merger would have increased four-firm
seller concentration from 24.4 percent to 28.8 percent, eight-firm concen-
tration from 40.9 percent to 44 percent, and twelve-firm concentration
from 48.8 percent to 50 percent.
Between 1948 and 1958, seller concentration had declined at the
four-firm level (from 25.9 percent). Safeway had lost almost half its mar-
ket share (from 14 percent), and the two largest sellers had lost one-third
of their combined market share (from 21 percent). At the eight- and
twelve-firm levels, seller concentration had increased (from 33.7 percent
and from 38.8 percent, respectively). Nevertheless, membership in the
group of top-ranked firms was hardly stable: Of the 20 largest sellers in
1958, seven "were not even in existence as chains in 1948."4
Declining concentration at the four-firm level, and instability of
market rank at the 20-firm level, were hardly surprising. "The continuing
population explosion of the Los Angeles area, which has outrun the
expansion plans of even the largest chains, offers a surfeit of business
opportunity for stores of all sizes"5 and there were "no substantial bar-
riers to market entry." In fact, "many of the stores opened by new en-
trants were obtained through the disposition of unwanted outlets by
chains; frequently the new competitors were themselves chain-store ex-
ecutives who had resigned to enter the market on their own. ,,6 Between
1953 and 1962, the number of chain stores operating in the area in-
creased from 96 to 150. In addition to thousands of single-outlet shops,
269 separate chains operated in the area at some time during that period.
On May 31, 1966, the Supreme Court decided to prohibit the merg-
er.7 Speaking through Justice Black, the court did not claim that the
merger had in fact diminished competition. Rather, citing the incipiency
1 The revolution is embodied in the merger guidelines of the Department of Justice.
As Ravenscraft (1987) points out, however, juxtaposition of the Johnson and Reagan ver-
sions understates the enforcement gap between the two administrations. The 1968, 1982,
and 1984 guidelines are reprinted in Commerce Clearing House, Trade Regulation Reporter,
volume 1, paragraphs 4490-4495 (1984), 4500-4505 (1982), and 4510 (1968). The Federal
Trade Commission has also announced its views of Section 7. A general statement appears
in paragraph 4516. Applications to specific industries appear in paragraphs 4520 (cement),
4525 (food distribution), and 4535 (textiles).
2 The Merger Modernization Act of 1986, $2160, 99th Congress, 2nd session.
3 The facts concerning this case are taken from the majority and minority opinions of
the U.S. Supreme Court, 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
4 384 U.S. 270, 290; Justice Stewart, dissenting.
5Ibid., 288. 6Ibid., 300. 7384 U.S. 270 (1966). 8 374 U.S. 321 (1966), 362.AN ANTITRUST PERSPECTIVE 175
doctrine announced in Philadelphia National Bank,a it asserted that the
merger might (with unspeculated probability) reduce competition in the
future.
Black justified his concern for future competition by citing the dis-
appearance of single-outlet grocery stores in the area. Between 1950 and
1961, the number of such stores declined from 5,365 to 3,818. Coupled
with the rise of seller concentration described above, and a history of
acquisitions by sellers ranked among the top 20 (if not the top few),
Black concluded: "These facts alone are enough to cause us to conclude
contrary to the district court that the Von’s-Shopping Bag merger did
violate section 7."9
Black’s accounts of the origins of the Clayton and Celler-Kefauver
Acts reveal his conviction that competition depends more on the preser-
vation of small business than on the limitation of seller concentration.
Regarding the Clayton Act, Black observes: "The Sherman Act failed to
protect the smaller businessmen from elimination through the monopo-
listic pressures of large combinations which used mergers to grow ever
more powerful. As a result in 1914 Congress, viewing mergers as a
continuous, pervasive threat to small business, passed section 7 of the
Clayton Act... ,,lo Regarding the Celler-Kefauver Act, Black adds: "Like
the Sherman Act in 1890 and the Clayton Act in 1914, the basic purpose
of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act was to prevent economic concentration
in the American economy by keeping a large number of small competi-
tors in business."
Unfortunately, Black fails to explain why small business per se pro-
motes competition. He presents a tempting target to those asserting that
his merger policy is really designed to restrict competition so as to pre-
serve a now inefficient way of life. From his brother, Justice Stewart, to
the majority of economists, most readers of his opinion have taken aim.
The Status Quo: Robert Bork
In The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, Robert Bork
opines that only two types of merger warrant legal intervention on anti-
trust grounds. The first involves combination of actual competitors--
firms that already sell either in the same market or in markets for substi-
tute products. The second involves fusion of potential competitors--
firms that most likely will become actual competitors in the future. La-
beling both as horizontal forms of merger, Bork argues that other types
of combination--vertical and conglomerate--should never be barred by
9 384 U.S. 270, 274.
10 384 U.S. 270, at 274-75.176 William James Adams
government: "Properly drawn and applied horizontal rules are all that
we need" (Bork 1978, p. 245).
Even horizontal mergers should be curbed only rarely. With respect
to mergers involving actual competitors, Bork is inclined to allow any
merger that confers less than 60 percent of well-defined markets on the
resulting enterprise. Ultimately, however, he adopts a position that
makes "presumptively lawful all horizontal mergers up to market shares
that would allow for other mergers of similar size in the industry and
still leave three significant companies. In a fragmented market, this
would indicate a maximum share attainable by merger of about 40 per-
cent. In a market where one company already has more than 40 percent,
the maximum would be scaled down accordingly. For example, where
one company already had 50 percent, it could not engage in any hori-
zontal mergers, and no other company could create by merger a share
above 30 percent (barring some exceptional circumstance, such as the
imminent failure of one of the merger partners)" (pp. 221-22). Mean-
while, elimination of potential competitors should be prevented "only
when three other conditions are met: the outside firm is a probable
entrant by internal growth if the merger is disallowed; there are no other
equally probable entrants; and entry is sufficiently difficult that restric-
tion of output is possible." In Bork’s view, "Very few industry situations
will meet these conditions . . . " (p. 260).
How does Bork justify the shave he applies to the Clayton Act? His
razor glides fundamentally on the proposition that competition policy
should be deployed to only one purpose: promotion of economic effi-
ciency. "Antitrust policy should never concern itself with equity in in-
come distribution" (p. 220). Implicitly, then, Bork suggests that
policymakers should ignore market power whenever it is exercised in
Pareto-optimal fashion.11
The significance of shifting antitrust’s focus from market power to
economic efficiency can be illustrated simply. Consider an industry char-
acterized by constant returns to scale. Currently, the industry contains
enough producers to guarantee competitive prices. These producers,
however, are contemplating merger. If, upon merger, they would not be
able to discriminate in price, industry output would fall after the merger.
If, however, they would be able to discriminate perfectly in price, output
would remain as it was before merger. Since discrimination enhances
their profit as well as their output, monopolists will indulge in it when-
ever possible. Thus, as long as perfect discrimination is feasible, Bork’s
11 For tactical reasons, no doubt, Bork refers to Pareto optimality as "the consumer
welfare model." Rather than describe social surplus as the sum of consumer and producer
surplus, he notes that ownership of producers by consumers makes producer surplus a
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welfare economics imply that a horizontal merger eliminating all compe-
tition should’ be allowed to stand.
The same logic applies to vertical mergers. Consider a bilateral mo-
nopoly in which the upstream monopolist determines the price of an
intermediate product (such as flour) and the downstream monopolist
determines the price of a final product (such as doughnuts). If the miller
is allowed to acquire the baker, the price of doughnuts will fall, and
production of both flour and doughnuts will increase. Bork explicitly
approves of such a merger (p. 230).
Now suppose the miller’s flour is used to bake bread as well as
doughnuts. To the extent that consumers exhibit inelastic demands for
bread and elastic demands for doughnuts, the miller would like to
charge high prices for flour used in bread and low prices for flour used in
doughnuts. Arbitrage between bakeries might prevent such discrimina-
tion, however, creating incentives for the miller to acquire all bakers of
doughnuts (Perry 1978). If prevented from engaging in such acquisi-
tions, the miller will charge the textbook’s monopoly price to all bakers.
This price will result in less output of flour than would either price
discrimination or extension of the miller’s monopoly forward into flour-
using activities. As long as the miller acquired his initial monopoly legal-
ly, he should be allowed to acquire the bakers of doughnuts (Bork 1978,
p. 240).
Having limited the scope of antitrust policy to realization of eco-
nomic efficiency, Bork justifies his preoccupation with horizontal merg-
ers in the following manner: Horizontal mergers can increase profits
even if they fail to increase productive efficiency. Vertical and conglomer-
ate mergers, however, only increase profits if they increase productive
efficiency. Such mergers might injure competing sellers, but they do not
endanger Pareto optimality. They should not, therefore, be prohibited
by law.
Bork employs this sequence of assertions to assail the argument of
Comanor (1967) that vertical mergers can cause barriers to new competi-
tion.12 Consider again the bilateral monopoly in which a single miller
sells flour to a single baker of doughnuts. As long as the two monopo-
lists transact at arm’s length, potential competitors might reasonably
contemplate entry into either line of business alone. In so doing, they
could achieve a position devoid of disadvantage vis-a-vis their incum-
bent rival. If, however, the miller merges with the baker, potential com-
petitors must integrate themselves or run the risk associated with being
forced to buy from or sell to a rival. Since the capital requirements of
integration exceed those of entering a single business, the incumbent’s
behavior (according to Comanor) might douse the enthusiasm of poten-
Interestingly, even the 1984 merger guidelines side in principle with Comanor.178 William James Adams
tial entrants for playing the incumbent’s game.
Not so, says Bork. As some potential competitors enter milling,
others might enter baking, obviating the need for an unintegrated en-
trant to deal with the integrated incumbent (p. 322). In the absence of
scope economies, the unintegrated newcomers will suffer no disadvan-
tage vis-a-vis their integrated predecessor. Moreover, bankers would be
delighted to finance companies entering profitable lines of business. "It
is hard to follow the assertion that there is a particularly high degree of
uncertainty when an industry is ’occupied by vertically integrated firms
enjoying the fruits of their fewness.’ It is precisely the presence of those
fruits that makes entry attractive and less uncertain" (p. 323).
Bork also deploys his logic to criticize an argument he attributes to
Areeda regarding the impact of vertical integration on the pace of inno-
vation. Areeda had observed that an upstream monopolist might be
induced to integrate forward in order to retard innovation at the down-
stream stage. Bork rejects the claim in these terms: "the loss of innova-
tiveness is as much a cost to the vertically integrating monopolist as it is
to society. Any ingot monopolist selling to competitive fabricators will
want his customers to be as vigorous, imaginative, and active as possi-
ble, because their success will enable him to sell them more ingot at a
monopoly price .... If he thinks the benefits outweigh the costs, there is
no reason for antitrust to second-guess him" (pp. 242-43).
In Robert Bork’s world, then, output restriction is the sole reason for
proscribing mergers, and output restriction can be expected from only a
few horizontal mergers. Most mergers are prompted by the desire to
realize economies of scale or scope. Such economies appear on social as
well as private ledgers of gain. No wonder Borkland rarely spawns
mergers in need of policy treatment.
The Adequacy of Bork’s Logic
Bork’s prescriptions for antitrust policy depend critically on his con-
ceptions of social welfare and market power. Unfortunately, he shrivels
the concepts of equity and market power; and he oversimplifies certain
theorems of welfare economics to the point of inaccuracy.
Social Welfare
The meaning of equity. Bork divides social welfare into matters of
equity and matters of efficiency. Equating equity with the distribution of
income, and observing that all economic activity redistributes income,
he asserts that any "choice between two groups of consumers.., should
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Even if we accept Bork’s view that maldistribution of income should
be treated by policies other than antitrust, we can disagree with his
decision to focus antitrust exclusively on efficiency. To define equity
solely in terms of income is to define the concept naively narrowly.
Equity also embraces the concept of procedural fairness, in political as
well as in economic life, and judicial activity has been inspired far more
and far longer by fairness than it has by efficiency.
Fairness is adjudicated most easily and most appropriately when
social consensus has been achieved as to what is fair. Whatever the
consensus on the fairness ranking of various distributions of income,
there may be substantial consensus on such elements of political equity
as "one man, one vote" or "equal protection of the laws." To the extent
that market power affects the distribution of political influence as well as
the distribution of income, antitrust authorities might properly be in-
structed to attack market power even if society cannot agree that the
monopolist’s income is unjust.
The standard argument supporting linkages between political and
economic power is that contained in the logic of collective action (Olson
1965). Due to the free-rider problem, benefits accruing to the many tend
to be represented less effectively than are benefits flowing to the few.
Hence concentrated industries tend to secure government’s sweetest
favors. Bork is aware of the argument, at least in Areeda’s version, yet he
discusses it as if he did not understand it (p. 240).
The meaning of allocative efficiency. Bork equates allocative efficiency
with maximization of output in partial-equilibrium settings. He does so
when he asserts that antitrust policy should aim at preventing output
restriction. Bork recognizes that in a world of second-best, restrictions of
output at the industry level may be socially efficient (p. 113). What he
does not appear to recognize is that even a first-best world may sport
monopolists who overproduce certain commodities (Adams and Yellen
1976). The oracle of allocative efficiency does not instruct us to tolerate
any monopolist who appears to abhor output restriction in a specific
situation.
The likelihood of productive inefficiency. In focusing on output restric-
tion, Bork implicitly reveals his belief (widely shared) that no profit-
maximizing firm, not even a monopolist, will employ inefficient
methods of production. Once again, Bork relies too readily on interme-
diate levels of economic theory. Profit maximization does not guarantee
productive efficiency in environments displaying market power. Wil-
liamson (1986) and Salop and Scheffman (1983) describe persuasively
how established firms might deliberately pad their costs so as to raise
the costs of rivals even further. Let me adduce two further examples,
both involving merger, and both involving technological change.
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above. In it, an upstream monopolist integrates forward to prevent tech-
nological change downstream. As we saw, Bork asserts that technologi-
cal change downstream will be desired as much by an upstream
monopolist as by society itself. Suppression of technological change can-
not, therefore, be the motiVe for forward vertical integration.
This argument depends on spinach-strong assumptions. In particu-
lar, it assumes that the innovation alters demand for the monopolist’s
(upstream) product in such a manner that expansion of output down-
stream augments demand upstream. If this condition fails to obtain, the
monopolist may gain from forward integration. After integrating, his
choice between burial and adoption of the innovation depends on a host
of factors, including the likelihood that other sellers downstream can
free-ride on the new technology once it is introduced.
The second example involves backward integration to retard inno-
vation. Consider a monopolist of long-distance telephone service be-
tween two points. Current states of technology and demand render the
monopoly natural in the sense that marginal cost is falling in the region
of market demand. Producers of telephone equipment, however, are
experimenting with new systems of transmission. One of these not only
reduces unit cost at each rate of operation but also shrinks minimum
efficient scale. Given market demand, the new technology would permit
several companies to provide service without sacrifice of productive effi-
ciency. As a result, natural barriers to entry would evaporate and suppli-
ers of telephone services would earn competitive rates of return. If
acquisition of upstream tinkerers retards or prevents the innovation, the
downstream monopolist may gain even though society loses.13
This example can be interpreted as a form of rent-seeking activity.
Such activity is undertaken quite frequently--so frequently that even
Judge Posner acknowledges its importance.14 The pursuit of economic
rent can break the one-to-one correspondence between productive effi-
ciency and profit maximization. And yet Bork refuses to admit the policy
consequences of the phenomenon (pp. 112-13).
Distributive efficiency. Distributive inefficiency occurs when existing
output can be reassigned among consumers so as to enhance the utilities
of some without detracting from the utilities of others. As long as each
unit of a given product is offered for sale at the same price, or as long as
each consumer is charged no less than his reservation price for each unit
13 If natural monopolists are regulated, the argument continues to hold in principle
unless regulators prevent realization of any monopoly profit.
14 According to Posner (1976, p. 11), traditional analysis of monopoly "ignored the fact
that an opportunity to obtain a lucrative transfer payment in the form of monopoly profits
will attract real resources into efforts by sellers to monopolize, and by consumers to pre-
vent being charged monopoly prices. The costs of the resources so used are costs of
monopoly just as much as the costs resulting from the substitution of products that cost
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he contemplates buying, distributive efficiency is assured. Where natu-
ral or institutional conditions permit firms with market power to dis-
criminate, but only imperfectly, distributive inefficiency is likely to
occur. Given the prevalence of imperfect price discrimination, Bork
should treat it explicitly. Since imperfect discrimination restricts output
in his sense, I presume that Bork would attack mergers that increase its
virulence.
Market Power
The Clayton Act prohibits mergers that might lessen competition
substantially or tend to create a monopoly. Neither preservation of small
business nor promotion of economic efficiency is mentioned explicitly in
the statute. A sound approach to merger policy should begin with a
sophisticated understanding of competition and monopoly.
All profit-maximizing enterprises aspire to monopoly. Few, howev-
er, succeed unilaterally in removing the elasticity from their demand
curves. Most must hope simply to share a dominant position; and collec-
tive monopolists must cooperate, implicitly or explicitly, to reap their
profits.
In most market environments, however, firms also experience in-
centives to defect from cooperative behavior. The tension between in-
centives to cooperate and incentives to defect on agreements creates
uncertainty about market outcomes. Believing that market environ-
ments determine the relative strengths of the two incentives, and hence
the probabilities associated with various forms of behavior, students of
industrial organization devote much of their attention to identifying en-
vironmental traits that are conducive to competition.
Many believers in the behavioral impact of environment agree with
Bork that markets can be analyzed independently when hunting for
predictors of cooperative behavior. Seller concentration, product differ-
entiation, the market share associated with operation at minimum effi-
dent scale, and the ratio of fixed to variable cost in the short run are
considered the most important determinants of actual and potential
competition, and each of these elements of market structure appears
suitable for examination without reference to conditions in other
markets.
I do not wish to assail the importance of accepted predictors of
market performance. Countless studies have verified their importance.
On both theoretical and empirical grounds, however, I do wish to ques-
tion the contention that the likelihood of cooperation or entry in specific
markets fails to depend on the integration patterns of those who inhabit
them.182 William James Adams
Consider first the issue of cooperation.IS Suppose that each of sev-
eral competitors in a given market must choose between the monopoly
price and another price halfway between monopoly and competition. If
each believes that the rest will match (instantaneously) its price, then all
will choose the monopoly price--effecting thereby the cooperative out-
come. But how does the firm acquire expectations regarding the behav-
ior of rival sellers? How does it establish its conjectural variations in
price or output? Experience within the market surely counts. If the seller
meets its rivals in other markets, however--especially in markets of
similar structure and technology--then experience in those other mar-
kets also matters. Just as there might be technological economies of
scope, so there might be informational economies of scope which give
rival oligopolists a better understanding of what to expect from each
other.
Information is not the only advantage of parallel integration. Paral-
lel oligoply may permit rivals to economize on damage deposits against
defection, to identify more cheaply those who do defect, to punish de-
fectors at more favorable ratios of enforcer benefit to enforcer cost, and
to avoid side payments detectable by antitrust authorities. 16
Patterns of integration also affect the correspondence between entry
and competition. The typical entrant in oligopolistic markets is already
engaged in other lines of business. If established sellers in its new mar-
ket happen also to operate in its other markets, the entrant might be
cooperating already with its new rivals. Such cooperation might facili-
tate further cooperation in the new market. In a world of parallel integra-
tion, entry does not always vitalize competition appreciably.
Parallel integration is just one of many reasons to believe that hori-
zontal dominance does not by itself determine power levels. For our
purposes, however, it suffices to make the point that antitrust authori-
ties should not believe that economic theory justifies benign neglect of
all but horizontal mergers.
The real problem with Bork’s conception of economic theory is his
failure to appreciate the grounding of strong propositions in strong as-
sumptions. Many of his "economic" assertions are true under certain
circumstances. Most, however, are false in a wide range of plausible
situations. It is intellectually inappropriate, therefore, to employ such
sweeping language as "Basic analysis shows that there is no threat to
competition in any conglomerate merger," (p. 246) or, "Antitrust’s con-
cern with vertical mergers is mistaken. Vertical mergers are means of
creating efficiency, not of injuring competition. There is a faint theoreti-
1~ For a fuller account of the theories presented here, see Adams (1974).
16 In addition to Adams (1974), see Krattenmaker and Salop (1986) and Bernheim and
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cal case, hardly worth mentioning, that vertical mergers can be used by
very large firm~ for purposes of predation under exceptional circum-
stances, but it is highly doubtful that that narrow possibility has any
application to reality" (p. 226).~ Bork’s unwillingness to refrain from such
rhetoric makes it difficult to reject the hypothesis that his views are
rooted more in ideology than in social science. The criticism he pins on
others--that one logical demonstration reveals nothing about the work-
ings of the world--applies to him in spades.17
Empirical Evidence Bearing on the Bork Approach
Bork apparently believes that antitrust policy can be formulated on
the basis of logic alone, for he offers no empirical support for his views.
One should not infer, however, from his taste for the a priori that such
evidence fails to exist. In this section, I shall report briefly the results of
some studies that impugn the adequacy of Bork’s framework.
Horizontal Mergers
Bork does not attempt to justify his threshold standard for horizon-
tal mergers with empirical evidence on the relationship between market
share and market power. And yet, such evidence does exist.
Several early studies suggested that, across manufacturing indus-
tries, market share of leading sellers does correlate positively with long-
run profitability--even at market shares below the threshold adopted by
Bork for government intervention.~8 Unfortunately, profitability has
been interpreted by some as a reward to productive efficiency, rather
than as a sign of market power; so the policy implications of these stud-
ies appeared ambiguous.
More recent evidence from the airline industry suggests that profit-
ability rises with market share even after costs are controlled. As in the
early studies, the effect of market share appears well before the thresh-
old picked arbitrarily by Bork. This evidence merits description in some
detail.
Airline service between two given cities might appear to exemplify a
contestable market. If existing providers of service attempt to raise
prices above cost, other established airlines--not to speak of brand-new
17 "We have built up an extraordinarily severe law on the basis of speculation alone,
and demonstrably empty speculation at that" (Bork 1978, p. 234). 1~ "PIMS data studies reveal that increasing sample businesses’ market share from 10
to 50 percent led on average to a doubling of ROI--from I6 to 32 percent" (Scherer 1980).
The PIMS data set was utilized in a series of studies undertaken at the Harvard Business
School. ROI denotes return on investment.184 William James Adams
carriers--can enter the market with ease (Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan
1985). Even at the four airports where regulatory constraints on landings
and takeoffs are binding, individual authorizations (s~ots) can be pur-
chased for surprisingly small sums--S500,000 to $750,000, according to
Borenstein (1987a, p. 16). As a result, even high levels of concentration
might be expected to result in competitive behavior and performance.
Bork’s retinue might be hard-pressed to brand any horizontal merger
between airlines as anticompetitive; they would certainly not leap to
curb mergers resulting in market shares below Bork’s trigger level.
Borenstein (1987a) estimated the determinants of revenue per pas-
senger mile on actual trips undertaken in the United States during the
fourth quarter of 1985. His explanatory variables include elements of
cost (distance associated with each ticket coupon used en route, volume
of traffic handled by the carrier at each airport en route); elements of
market power (market share of the carrier at the initial and ultimate
airports, concentration in a few rival airlines of traffic not handled by the
carrier at those two locations, existence of regulatory constraints on
landings and takeoffs at the two locations), and a few other variables (for
example, the ratio of actual to non-stop distance between origin and
destination). These factors explain 70 percent of the variance among
trips in revenue per mile.
Flight-specific costs do affect revenue per mile: the longer the flight,
the lower the revenue per mile. Similarly, airport-specific costs of a carri-
er also affect revenue per mile: the greater the carrier’s traffic at stops en
route, the lower the revenue per mile.
Market Share Fare Premium
(Percent) (Percent)
10 to 20 9.5
20 to 30 17.6
30 to 40 34.8
40 to 50 27.8
50 to 60 46.9
60 to 70 44.3
70 + 44.9
For example, raising market share from less than 10 percent to be-
tween 30 percent and 40 percent, other things equal, would, on average,
raise revenue per mile by 35 percent. Beyond market shares of 50 percent
to 60 percent, revenue per mile no longer rises with the proportion of
traffic controlled by the carrier. By that point, however, revenue per mile
is more than 40 percent above what it would have been (other things
equal) at market shares under 10 percent. In other words, the marginal
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market share that fails, according to Bork, to warrant control of mergers.
Market share is not the only determinant of market power revealed
in Borenstein’s study. Other things equal, including market share, rev-
enue per mile is significantly greater when the. origin or destination is.a
Slot-c6nstrained airport. Moreover, residual seller concentration--con-
centration of that part of the market not handled by the carrier--im-
pinges positively on the carrier’s revenue per mile. The sign of this
coefficient is consistent with the existence of cooperation among rival
carriers. 19
Borenstein’s results indicate that barriers to new competition in
route-specific markets are substantially greater than believers in the con-
testability of markets might predict.2° Frequent flyer programs, coupled
with the mechanics of computer-based reservation systems controlled
by leading carriers, reduce cross-price elasticities of demand between
carriers. Passengers tending to fly to or from a small set of locations will
find it both convenient and (for business travel, at least) advantageous
to fly primarily with the leading airlines serving those locations. Under
these circumstances, marginal entry may not be profitable. Unless a new
provider of service is willing to establish a density of flights comparable
to those of significant incumbents, it is unlikely to match their profits;
and yet most airports handle insufficient traffic to serve as hubs for
multiple airlines.
The importance of radical (as opposed to marginal) entry also ex-
plains the low price charged for the right to land at a slot-constrained
airport. A major attraction of serving a slot-controlled airport is the de-
sire to exercise market power. But market power requires nontrivial mar-
ket share--market share in excess of that associated with a single slot. To
acquire market share sufficient to achieve some modicum of power re-
quires multiple slots, and the price per slot certainly rises with the num-
ber of slots demanded.
Notice the analogy to a standard observation in the takeover litera-
ture. Those who acquire quoted companies tend to pay substantial pre-
mia over current market prices. They do so because they wish to acquire
more than rights to receive dividends and capital gains: their aim is to
control the target company, and control implies ownership of a substan-
tial fraction of the target’s stock.
The conclusion to be drawn from work of Borenstein and others is
that horizontal mergers injure competition even when combined market
19 It is also consistent with the view, endorsed by Bork, that giants do not trample
upon pygmies. The position of the giant is most advantageous when the giant faces a
cloud of atomistic competitors. Power exercised against the interest of the fringe would
imply a negative sign on the coefficient associated with residual concentration.
2o Other studies confirm the relationship between seller concentration at the airport
level and fares. See Kaplan (1986, p. 64); see also the studies of Morrison and Winston
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share falls well below the Bork threshold and even when casual observa-
tion suggests barriers to entry are low. Discounts to frequent flyers and
preferential positioning in computer-based reservation systems are the
kinds of practices that led Chief Justice Warren to endorse (in Brown Shoe)
the congressional view that "a merger has to be functionally viewed, in
the context of its particular industry.’21
Non-Horizontal Mergers
Empirical evidence also supports the proposition that intermarket
relationships affect the state of competition. Heggestad and Rhoades
(1978) examined instability between 1966 and 1972 in the market shares
of the three leading commercial banks in each of 187 Standard Metro-
politan Statistical Areas. Arguing that instability of share is directly relat-
ed to the degree of rivalry, and hence to the vitality of competition, they
hypothesized that such instability should correlate negatively with seller
concentration (three-bank level), positively with growth of deposits in
the market (1966-72), negatively with such institutional constraints on
competition as regulation of branching, and--if parallel integration af-
fects the degree of cooperation--negatively with the number of times
leading sellers in the market (the top five) meet each other elsewhere in
the state. Heggestad and Rhoades test several versions of the multimar-
ket contact variable, ranging from inclusion of all contacts to inclusion
only of contacts in (a) large markets or (b) markets where the two firms
collectively exhibit a large market share in relation to leading sellers.
They also distinguish situations where high counts of interaction occur
because a few firms meet each other in many places from situations
where high counts occur because many firms meet each other in a few
places. All explanatory variables display the predicted sign. In every
version, the multimarket contact variable differs negatively from 0 at the
.10 level of statistical significance.22
The findings of Heggestad and Rhoades are consistent with those in
other studies of parallel integration in banking (Solomon 1970; Rhoades
and Heggestad 1985). They are also consistent with evidence based on a
21 370 U.S. 294, at 321-322.
22 When multimarket contact is measured only in markets where the two sellers enjoy
a combined market share of at least one-third the market share of the three largest sellers,
and where it weights multiple contacts among a few firms especially heavily, the coeffi-
cient differs negatively from 0 at the .05 level of statistical significance.
23 Feinberg (1985, p. 225) concludes: "At the company level the evidence supports the
theory, showing sales-at-risk, a measure of the importance of multimarket contacts, to
increase price-cost margins in the moderate range of concentration where collusion is
feasible but difficult to achieve without mutual forbearance. The industry-level results are
weaker, casting some doubt on the hypothesis." Similarly, Scott (1982, p. 375) observes:
"The results imply that multimarket contact does have an impact on performance.., con-
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full spectrum of manufacturing industries.23 The market-power conse-
quences of multimarket contact might even explain the finding that inte-
gration tends to be most profitable when a firm extends its product line
into areas relatively close to home (Rhoades 1973 and 1974): the farther
afield the new activity, the less likely is further contact with established
rivals.24 Although multimarket contact deserves a good deal more em-
pirical study, we may conclude provisionally that parallel integration
might well enhance market power. Mergers that fail to influence the
degree of horizontal dominance can nevertheless impair competition.
Apart from reminding antitrust authorities that merger policy
should not ignore vertical and conglomerate mergers, the conception of
market power advanced here has certain practical virtues. In the Bork
approach, a merger must be horizontal or it cannot harm competition.25
If it can be shown that the merging firms operate in different markets,
and that plenty of potential competitors exist, the merger will almost
assuredly pass scrutiny. On the other hand, if the merger involves two
competitors, and their market shares are significant, the merger may
well be challenged. As a result, lawyers are encouraged to devote all
their efforts to defining relevant markets in advantageous manners--
opponents of the merger seeking either narrow definitions to show large
market shares or broad definitions to show similarities of product. Once
it is recognized that mergers with horizontal effects are not the only ones
that might jeopardize competition, greater attention can be devoted to
improving our understanding of how any type of merger might be anti-
competitive. Economists and lawyers alike will be liberated to search
without blinders for the specific traits of market and company structure
associated with the exercise of market power.
Unintentionally, the approach to market power adopted here pro-
vides Justice Black with a logically coherent justification for his predispo-
sition to favor small business. Black emphasized the single-store
characteristic of small groceries. But firms with single shops are firms
that have not integrated into several grocery markets. They cannot have
engaged in parallel integration with rival stores. Their scope for coopera-
tion may be small in comparison with that available to firms with identi-
cal market shares but different propensities to intersect in a plethora of
geographically distinct markets.
At the same time, the doctrine of parallel integration would provide
followers of Bork with a compelling justification for allowing Von’s to
acquire Shopping Bag. Neither chain operated in multiple retail markets
24 As Ravenscraft (1987) observes, this finding can also be explained by economies of
SCO e.
P2s In both the 1982 and the 1984 merger guidelines, competitive injury is discussed
under two headings: horizontal mergers, and horizontal effects of non-horizontal
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(unless one considers Los Angeles itself to comprise multiple markets).
Even combined, the two confined their activities to a single metropolitan
area. Thus, even if parallel integration merits government intervention,
the concept should be applied to a Safeway, a Krogers, or an A&P.
Parallel integration applies as much to banking as to food retailing.
It might have provided a strong argument for prohibiting Seattle’s Na-
tional Bank of Commerce from acquiring the Washington Trust Bank of
Spokane, as described in Marine Bancorporation.26 Ironically, however,
Black’s eagerness to defend small business on weak terrain prevented
such an experiment.
An Agenda for Students of Merger Policy
During the next decade, the distribution of mergers by type and by
industry is likely to change appreciably. As a result, antitrust authorities
will be obliged to ponder the competitive effects of mergers in relatively
unfamiliar situations. It is important to anticipate some of the issues that
will arise.
(1) Joint ventures. We are likely to witness the proliferation of partial
mergers--joint ventures created for nominally limited purposes.27
NUMMI, the offspring of General Motors and Toyota, exemplifies the
joint venture engaged in production. Especially challenging, however,
will be the treatment of joint ventures engaged in inventive activities
(Grossman and Shapiro 1986). The antitrust laws have already been re-
laxed legislatively on behalf of cooperative research.28
(2) Crisis mergers. Just as Appalachian Coals29 once justified the for-
mation of crisis cartels--cartels born amidst severe macroeconomic con-
traction--so there will be calls to permit horizontal merger of companies
not yet threatened with bankruptcy but faced nonetheless with the col-
lective necessity of major structural adjustment. The steel industry is a
likely case in point.B°
(3) Mergers in deregulated industries. Antitrust law tends to im-
pinge lightly on regulated industries. Even so, regulated industries tend
not to experience heavy doses of merger. Upon deregulation, however,
26 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
27 Since 1918, export cartels enjoy statutory exemption from antitrust prosecution un-
der the Webb-Pomerene Act. Although few in number, such associations tend to link
producers inhabiting concentrated industries.
28 National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, PL 98-462.
29 288 U.S. 344 (1933). 3o In 1968, Wheeling (#10) merged with Pittsburgh (#16). In 1971, Jones & Laughlin
(#7) merged with Youngstown (#8). In 1983, LTVadded Republic to a steel portfolio which
already included Jones & Laughlin!Youngstown. Meanwhile, however, U.S. Steel was
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merger activity can escalate sharply.31 "Thus, deregulation has the poo
tential to be a major determinant of the current merger wave" (Ravens-
craft 1987).
Given the flux in economic circumstance, even restoration of the
status quo ante in merger policy would not suffice to guarantee high-
quality competition. Future merger policy will of course require refine-
ment of our theories of market power; and, in response to demand,
theoretical papers will sprout. In all probability, however, these will es-
tablish that mergers of a given type are likely to increase social surplus in
some circumstances but reduce it in others. The most important step,
therefore, in our preparation for the future is to abandon the ideological
approach to antitrust, exemplified by Robert Bork, and to recognize the
importance of seeking empirical evidence on the sources and uses of
market power. Given the height of the present merger wave, this search
must not be delayed.
The papers presented at this conference certainly help us to appreci-
ate the limitations of a priori speculation. Richard Caves provid6s us
with strong evidence that ex ante valuations of company stock predict
poorly the efficiency gains associated with mergers. His evidence sup-
ports the position that mergers that injure competition may be pro-
scribed without undue fear--as expressed in the current merger
guidelines--that productive efficiency will be jeopardized.
Caves also points out that the empirical foundations of merger poli-
cy may be fashioned from foreign as well as domestic materials. In fact,
international evidence has two major virtues in the present context.
First, the rich countries have adopted a continuum of approaches to
merger: Some have renounced all (antitrust) regulation; others have cho-
sen modest levels of intervention; only a few are said to bridle mergers
sharply.32 Consider, for example, last year’s treatment of mergers in
Europe:33
® France: No mergers were prohibited under national antitrust rules.
31 Mergers contemplated and consummated in the airline industry are reported in
Levine (1987) and Borenstein (1987~o). More generally: "All of these [deregulated] indus-
tries--banking, broadcasting, communications, transportation, and oil and gas--have ex-
perienced a substantial amount of merger activity in the 1980s. According to W.T. Grimm’s
figures, these five industries accounted for 37 percent of all merger activity by value of
assets and 22 percent of the number of mergers, between 1981 and 1986" (Ravenscraft
1987).
32 For France, see Act No. 77-806 of July 19, 1977, title II; for Germany, see the Act
against Restraints of Competition of 27 July 1957, section 24, as amended in 1973; for
Japan, see the Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair
Trade (Act No. 54 of April 14, 1947), Chapter IV, section 10; for the United Kingdom, see,
Fair Trading Act 1973, part V. All appear in English translation in Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (1981). 33 The following evidence is taken from EC Commission (1987).
34 The case involved acquisition of one German producer of industrial gases (Agefko
Kohlensaueare Industrie) by another (Linde). The cartel office subsequently allowed L’Air
Liquide, a major French producer of gases, to acquire Agefko. Claiming inadequacy of
German statute, the cartel office reluctantly approved the acquisition of AEG by Daimler
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® Italy: No mergers were prohibited under national antitrust rules.
® Germany: The Federal Cartel Office prohibited one merger;34 11 were
abandoned voluntarily after intervention by that agency.
®United Kingdom: The Director-General of Fair Trading advised the
Secretary of State on 293 mergers; the Secretary of State referred 13
mergers to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (six of these
were then abandoned voluntarily); and the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission issued six reports, two of which concluded that the
merger being considered would operate against the public interest.B5
® European Communities: The EC Commission continued its 13-year-
old effort to gain approval by the Council of its draft regulation on
merger control. Currently, mergers covered by the Treaty of Rome
can be prohibited only if they reinforce (as opposed to create) a
dominant position.B6 Even this limited weapon has been used spar-
ingly:B7 Between June 1985 and May 1986, the 1,000 largest compa-
nies in the European Communities engaged in 296 mergers and an
additional 163 acquisitions of minority holdings. None in either cate-
gory was challenged on antitrust grounds.
Coupled with North American and Japanese evidence, the European
record should help us to unlock the impact of antitrust policy on the
frequency of merger and the structure of relevant markets.
The second virtue of international evidence on merger policy stems
from the fact that each merger issue of the future--joint ventures in
production and research, mergers to combat structural imbalance, and
the relationship between mergers and regulation--has been or is being
debated vigorously abroad.B8
Joint ventures of various forms have been scrutinized frequently
under the antitrust laws of the European Communities. A good exam-
ple, in light of current interest in cooperative R&D, is the Henkel/Col-
gate case.39 These two large manufacturers of personal and home care
products decided to create a joint venture to explore new technologies
relevant to household detergents. The agreement left each party free to
employ the joint venture’s discoveries in any way it pleased and to
engage in R&D on its own. Within the European Economic Community
35 One involved the acquisition of Mitel by British Telecom (Cmnd 9715, January
1986). The other involved merger of General Electric Co. (GEC) and Plessey (Cmnd 9897,
August 1986).
36 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v. EC Commis-
sion, [1973] CMLR 199.
37 So sparingly, in fact, that a recent British effort to enjoin a prospective merger
(Argyll Group plc & Others v. Distillers Company plc) on the grounds that it contravened
Artide 86 EEC "was refused on grounds of uncertainty and convenience." (EC Commis-
sion 1987, point 200).
38 Another relevant issue--the importance of foreign competition when defining mar-
ket boundaries--has been considered routinely in antitrust proceedings abroad.
39 Re Henkel-Colgate, December 23, 1971, JO 1972 L1ad14.AN ANTITRUST PERSPECTIVE 191
as a whole, the two accounted for 37 percent of detergent sales. In
particular countries of the community, one or the other accounted for
more than 50 percent of such sales. Together with Unilever and Procter
& Gamble, the two accounted for a large majority of European sales of
most products in their lines.
The EC Commission allowed the venture to stand, even though it
restricted competition. The Commission justified its decision by arguing
that the joint venture promoted technical progress, allowed consumers
to share in the benefits, restrained competition no more than necessary,
and restrained competition insubstantially.
Subsequent to Henkel/Colgate, the Commission has introduced a
block exemption for agreements relating to R&D, whereby cooperative
inventive activity enjoys automatic exemption from EC antitrust law as
long as it meets certain criteria.4° Ventures that fail to qualify for block
exemption remain eligible for individual exemption. Early indications
suggest that the block exemption will be accorded sparingly.41
Crisis mergers have also been scrutinized by the Commission,42
especially the steel mergers covered by Article 66 of the Treaty of Paris.43
Such mergers have occurred frequently; they often include producers
accounting for major fractions of national output.44 To my knowledge,
no steel merger has been blocked by the Court of Justice. The European
strategy of managed merger and contraction of the steel industry (the
Davignon Plan) has in fact been accompanied by reductions of capac-
ity,45 but the causal relationship between policy and structural change
remains untested.
4o Regulation (EEC) No 418/85 of December 19, 1984 (OJ L 53, 22.2.1985), which took
effect in March 1985.
4~ See, for example, the treatment of an agreement between BP International Ltd and
MW Kellogg Company, decisiOn of December 2, 1985 (OJ L 369, 31.12.1985).
42 The Commission has also investigated swapping of lines of business between
firms. See its decision of 4 December 1986 (OJ L 5, 7.1.1987) in the matter of
ENI/Montedison.
43 The EC Commission enjoys explicit authority to regulate mergers in industries cov-
ered by the European Coal and Steel Community; the Treaty of Rome, instituting the
European Economic Community, does not identify merger as an antitrust offense. In Con-
tinental Can, however, the Court of Justice of the EC held that mergers can be considered
abuses of dominant position and hence illegal under article 86 of the Treaty of Rome. Since
1973, the Commission has been seeking approval by the Council of explicit merger rules
(EC Commission 1986, p. 47).
~ During 1985, for example, the Commission approved 7 of 7 mergers covered by the
rules of the ECSC (EC Commission 1986, pp. 86-89).
4s See, for example, EC Commission 1986, p. 152, table 5.192 William James Adams
Finally, for the past several years, the EC Commission has devoted
considerable attention to the state of competition in air transport.46 Until
now, the Commission’s efforts have aimed at relaxation of national con-
trois on the freedom of carriers to price as they please.47 Given the trend
toward privatization of national carriers and development of joint oper-
ating agreements, however, the Commission may be called upon shortly
to evaluate mergers in this industry. At the national level, British anti-
trust authorities have just decided to allow the recently privatized Brit-
ish Airways to acquire British Caledonian Airways, even though British
Airways already accounts for 83 percent of Britain’s "international sched-
uled aviation market" and absorption of British Caledonian would boost
that figure to 95 percent.4s
Foreign evidence must be interpreted with care. Mergers that fail to
injure competition in foreign settings may injure competition here, and
vice versa. Nevertheless, it is myopic to ignore the experience of other
rich market economies. Many (but by no means all) features of European
legislation, regulation, and interpretation reflect apparent adherence to
maxims encouraging relaxation of merger control. As a result, the impact
on competition of policies proposed for the United States can be evaluat-
ed empirically. Far be it for me to draw conclusions from research not yet
performed, but I suspect that foreign evidence would confirm the im-
portance of shedding our currenttolerance of anticompetitive mergers.
46 See EC Commission, Civil Aviation Memorandum No. 2, March 15, 1984 (OJ C 182,
9.7.1984).
47 In many EC countries, airline fares must be approved governmentally before they
can be implemented. On international routes, served typically by at least one carrier from
each country, "competing" airlines tend to set prices cooperatively before submitting their
requests to relevant national authorities. Some such authorities encourage--others go so
far as to require--the cooperation. On July 18, 1986, the EC Commission attacked this
method of pricing as a violation of the Rome treaty. The EC Court of Justice then held
(Ministere Public v. Asjes and Others, OJ C 131, 25.9.1986 ["Nouvelles Frontieres"]) that
the treaty’s rules of competition do apply to transport, but that enforcement would remain
with national governments until the council signed the necessary enabling rules. Al-
though obliged in principle to abide by the pro-competition philosophy of the treaty, and
although subject to investigation by the EC Commission, national governments remain
free in practice to maintain existing modes of cooperation.
4~ The Economist, July 25, 1987, p. 15, and November 14, 1987, pp. 64-65. British Air-
ways must surrender its licenses to serve certain routes (although it may apply for them
anew) and it must surrender takeoff and landing slots at Gatwick airport, "many of which
it might well have given up anyway." The Economist, November 14, 1987, p. 64.AN ANTITRUST PERSPECTIVE 193
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Jim Adams’s paper appears to be a revival of the populist antipathy
towards combinations among large firms. Adams asks us to reconsider
merger policy because these large firms might acquire greater political
power, might affect the distribution of income, and might distort resource
allocation through mergers and takeovers.
There is very little reference in the paper to the vast body of indus-
trial organization research that helped to reverse the 1960s (and later)
tide of increasing legal attacks on mergers of all sizes and descriptions.
Nor does Adams provide any new body of research that shows these
earlier studies to be flawed. Indeed, the paper even overlooks some
recent research that could be mustered in support of Adams’s abhor-
rence of mergers.
The Requisites for a Revival of Antimerger Policy
If I were launching an attack on the recent permissive trend towards
mergers by antitrust authorities in both Democratic and Republican ad-
ministrations, I would need at least the following ammunition to throw
at the enemy:
(1) Evidence that there has been an increase in either market con-
centration, aggregate concentration, or parallel integration in the U.S.
economy.
(2) Evidence that mergers have contributed to this increase in
concentration.
* Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution.196 Robert W. Crandall
(3) Evidence that the increase in concentration is likely to result in a
decrease in economic welfare.
(4) A pragmatic rule that would allow antitrust authorities to inter-
vene to stop socially undesirable mergers while allowing useful consoli-
dations, takeovers, and acquisitions to be consummated.
Without a doubt, this is a large order, but I do not think that Adams
has even begun to supply the needed firepower for a revival of the
populist antipathy towards mergers. In my view, the "new learning" in
industrial organization escapes from his assault relatively unscathed. Let
me elaborate by examining each of the above requisites.
Changes in Concentration
Nowhere in Adams’s paper: is there reference to a dangerous in-
crease in or even a dangerous level of market concentration, parallel
integration, or aggregate concentration. Certainly, part of the populist
fuel for antimerger policy in the 1960s was a belief that Exxon, General
Electric, IBM, and General Motors would some day control the world.
Aggregate concentration in manufacturing (however relevant or irrele-
vant such a concept may be) was rising dramatically from 1947 through
1966. The largest 50 firms accounted for 17 percent of manufacturing
value added in 1947. By 1966, the largest 50 firms (a somewhat different
group) controlled 25 percent of value added. The share of the largest 200
manufacturing firms rose from 30 percent to 42 percent in the same
period.
During the 1950s and the 1960s, average concentration within indi-
vidual manufacturing industries was also rising, but at a glacial pace.
Nevertheless, readers of Servan-Schreiber or Galbraith might have been
excused if they held to a belief that large industrial giants were increas-
ing their dominance of most of the world’s important markets.
Obviously, the world has changed. Aggregate concentration in U.S.
manufacturing in the 1980s is almost exactly where it was in 1966. In
services such as banking, U.S. firms have sagged badly relative to the
rest of the world. Whatever the current average level of market concen-
tration in U.S. manufacturing, it means very little unless assessed in the
context of global competition. Americans are not now worried about the
market dominance of leading firms in U.S. manufacturing--they are
worried that these wimpy giants cannot compete with Korean, Japa-
nese, German, or Taiwanese firms.
Adams provides us with no new data for the intellectual heirs of
Servan-Schreiber to gnaw upon. There is nothing in this paper to sug-
gest that concentration is rising--that market dominance is increasing in
U.S. industries. There is nothing to suggest that multinational, con-DISCUSSION 197
glomerate firms are acquiring greater economic, social, or political pow-
er. Why then should we be concerned about mergers?
The Effects of Mergers on Concentration
Mergers might increase market concentration or aggregate concen-
tration, and they may lead to greater parallel integration. But is there
any evidence of these effects from the recent merger waves? Note that
the merger boom of the 1960s does not seem to have led to major in-
creases in concentration in the U.S. economy in the 1970s or 1980s. Even
where mergers have reduced the number of competitors in an important
industry--such as steel or automobiles--U.S, firms hardly seem poised
to extract large monopoly rents, because of competition from foreign
producers (unless we close the doors to imports). Nor does it appear that
the current wave of large and sometimes hostile takeovers or mergers
has increased concentration perceptibly.
Work by Ravenscraft and Scherer may help to explain why mergers
have not had these effects upon concentration. They have found that a
large share of acquisitions work out poorly for the acquiring company in
the long run. Over time, a large share of these acquisitions are spun off
because they perform so badly within the merged firm.
Nor have recent mergers contributed much to aggregate concentra-
tion or parallel integration. Indeed, Ivan Boesky and T. Boone Pickens
are not IBM or Exxon. Nor do they appear to be seeking to increase the
degree of vertical integration of their targets. If anything, they are mov-
ing in the opposite direction.
The Dangers of Concentration
Even if mergers were increasing U.S. market concentration or ag-
gregate concentration, Adams provides us with little that is new that
would cause us to fear such a trend. He only mentions in passing the
"new learning" in industrial organization that provides the intellectual
underpinnings of current merger policy. He offers us a rather paltry
array of new studies that may be seen to be taking issue with this re-
search. First, he cites a study by Borenstein, prepared as advocacy testi-
mony in a merger case, to suggest that concentration affects prices. He
would have done better to emphasize the work of Morrison and Win-
ston, now only briefly referred to; they demonstrate rather persuasively
(in refereed works) that airline market concentration matters. However,
invoking his own admonition not to fall into careless traps about the
relationship between concentration and economic welfare, Adams must198 Robert W. Crandall
admit that, in this market, concentration may confer some improve-
ments in general economic welfare in the form of simpler passenger
scheduling and single-line continuity on trips through hubs.
As for the effects of aggregate concentration on parallel market
structures, Adams may have found a chink in the armor of the "new
learning." A few studies seem to show that firms with multiple-market
contacts among each other may be less aggressive competitors than
firms in single markets of similar concentration. I would read this litera-
ture with caution, however, especially where it pertains to regulated
industries, such as banks. If enough evidence is amassed to suggest that
parallel integration or conglomerate firms provide the opportunity for
collusive signalling, we might want to reevaluate our policy toward ver-
tical or conglomerate mergers. We might also want to ask why Pickens
and Roger Smith are so intent in reducing vertical integration in their
respective industries.
I do not find Adams’s reference to some of the "new new" learning
as persuasive. Inventive theorists such as Salop, Scheffman, or Stiglitz
can develop interesting models that demonstrate a variety of dangers.
Some show that under the appropriate assumptions, prices increase
with the degree of contestability of a market. Others conclude that prices
may actually be lower with greater market concentration under various
assumptions. These are interesting models, but they have not been sub-
jected to empirical testing, nor has it been suggested that they might
enjoy universal relevance.
Decision Rules for Antitrust Enforcement
Even if he had shown us that concentration is increasing, that it is
increasing because of mergers, and that such increases are a threat to
general economic welfare, Adams has not given us a new decision rule
to guide intervention. He admits that Von’s Grocery was bad policy, but
what is to replace it? Even the Herfindahl ratios in the current guidelines
stand naked with little to support them. How would one write the rule
for more aggressive intervention? And would the courts allow such a
policy to stand?
Adams has given us little to chew upon. He may get his wish for a
more activist antitrust policy in the next Administration, but it is far from
clear just what form such a policy might assume or that economic wel-
fare would be enhanced by it.